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Abstract
The recent demonetization exercise in India is a unique monetary experiment that
made 86 percent of the total currency in circulation invalid. In a country where cur-
rency in circulation constitutes 12 percent of GDP, the policy turned out to be a
purely exogenous macroeconomic shock that affected all agents of the economy. This
paper documents the impact of this macroeconomic shock on one such systematically
important agent of the economy: the household. By construction, the policy helped
households with bank accounts in disposing of the demonetized cash. We use a new
household-level data set to tease out the effects of this policy on households with no
bank accounts relative to households with bank accounts. Our results show that the
impact of demonetization on household income and expenditure has been transient
with the major impact being seen in December-2016. We find that households with no
bank accounts experienced a significant decrease in both income and expenditure in
December-2016. There is significant heterogeneity in the impact across households in
different asset classes. We also show evidence of recovery of household finances whereby
households were able to smooth out consumption during the post-demonetization pe-
riod. However, this recovery phase is associated with an increase in household bor-
rowing from different sources, primarily for the purpose of consumption. In particular,
informal borrowing (money lenders, shops) increased substantially during this period.
Thus, the policy although transient in nature, contributed to the unintended conse-
quence of increased leverage for households.
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1 Introduction
On November 08, 2016 the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, announced that higher
denomination notes (500 and 1000 rupee notes) will cease to be legal tenders from the
midnight of the same day. The demonetized notes comprised 86 percent of the total currency
in circulation. The demonetization shock can be characterized as an exogenous macro-level
shock impacting macro fundamentals, but its effects were expected to percolate to the micro
level since cash plays an essential role in the day to day transaction of the Indian economy.1
Moreover, the informal sector in India is large contributing 43.2 percent to the Gross Value
Added and employing more than 80 percent of total labor force.2 Given the large size
of the informal sector, a cash shortage due to demonetization is expected to impact the
majority of the players in the Indian economy. In this paper we focus on one such important
player in the economy: the households. We look at household level data to tease out the
effects of this sudden liquidity shock on income and expenditure. We then delve deeper
to ask if demonetization had a heterogeneous effect on households. Although, the costs of
demonetization appear almost immediately while the benefits are expected to be seen in a
more medium term horizon with the broadening of the tax base and more digitization of
payments, in this paper, we mainly focus on the short term costs of demonetization, given
that the available time series for analyzing the benefits is short. However, we provide some
evidence of the recovery phase that followed after demonetization. In what follows, we try
to quantify the impact of the policy on households, and also uncover potentially interesting
and important dimensions of heterogeneity in the data. Before we provide more details of
the policy in the the next section, we present a brief review of the literature to situate our
study in the larger context of liquidity constraints.
1Currency in circulation as a percentage of GDP is 12 percent as of March, 2016 and 11 percent as of
March, 2018. The numbers are calculated using official numbers released by the Reserve Bank of India and
Central Statistics Office.
2CSO [2018]and ILO [2018]
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Our paper relates to the literature on household liquidity, income shocks and consump-
tion smoothing. Several empirical studies on household saving and consumption examine
the importance of liquidity constraints (Zeldes [1989];Jappelli [1990]; Runkle [1991]; Jappelli
et al. [1998]) and quite a few of these papers use data on credit card usage and change
in borrowing limits. Zeldes [1989] partitions households in his sample according to finan-
cial wealth relative to income and total wealth relative to income and defines a constrained
household as one with assets worth less than 2 months of income. Souleles [1999] identifies
credit constrained households by holdings of liquid wealth relative to earnings. This classifi-
cation of households allows him to document that the consumption of non-durable goods for
credit constrained families (the bottom 15% of the liquid wealth-to-earnings distribution) is
sensitive to predictable changes in earnings, whereas non-durable consumption for uncon-
strained households (the top 25th percentile of the liquid wealth-to-earnings distribution) is
not sensitive to these anticipated changes. Gross and Souleles [2002] examine households’
responses to exogenous changes in the borrowing limit on credit cards. They find that, on
average, consumers increase their debt holdings by 10% to 14% of the increase in the bor-
rowing. Investigating the effects of the US Supreme Court decision that deregulated bank
credit card interest rates in December 1978, Zinman [2003] compares consumers’ acquisition
and usage of credit cards between states that mandated binding usury limits before the court
decision and states that were unaffected by deregulation. His results suggest that households
who seem to be credit constrained used the easier access to credit to acquire credit cards
and borrow frequently on their new credit cards. More recently Krueger and Perri [2011]
show the effects of labor income shocks, on consumption, are modestly persistent. This is so
because the consumption can be well insured using simple unsecured borrowing and saving.
Our definition of being liquidity constrained is different from the above literature because
India is relatively more cash-based than other advanced economies. The demonetization exer-
cise reduced the amount of cash that individuals held, and we seek to explore the adjustment
process that followed thereafter. Given the nature of the exercise, having a bank account was
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quite essential because it was easier to exchange the demonetized banknotes. We compare
the households with bank accounts with those that did not have access to bank accounts.
In addition, we look at the impact on households along the entire asset distribution. To this
end, we construct an asset index and look at the impact of the liquidity shock on various
quartiles of this distribution.
There is an emerging strand of literature that specifically studies the demonetization
exercise in India. Aggarwal and Narayanan [2017] study the impact on the agricultural
sector while Dash et al. [2017] show how demonetization has led to households savings
through more formal channels. RBI [2017] analyzes the broad macroeconomic trends in the
aftermath of demonetization and Behera et al. [2017] study the impact on the financial sector.
Our study, in contrast, uses micro-data at the household level, and analyzes the unintended
heterogeneous consequences on the households. We confirm the results obtained in previous
studies that the aggregate macro impact was transient. In contrast to other studies, however,
we document the impact of the macro-level demonetization shock at the micro level. Our
results show that the impact of demonetization on household income and expenditure has
been transient with the major impact being seen in December-2016. We find that households
with no bank accounts experienced a significant decrease in both income and expenditure
in December-2016. These effects however differ for households across different asset classes
and across professions. We also show evidence of recovery of household finances whereby
households were able to smooth out consumption during the post-demonetization period.
This recovery phase is associated with an increase in household borrowing from different
sources, primarily for the purpose of consumption. In particular, informal borrowing (money
lenders, shops) increased substantially during this period. Our results thus show that the
policy although transient in nature, contributed to the unintended consequence of increased
leverage for households, thereby leaving them more vulnerable than before.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and
some details on demonetization. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. We
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also discuss some due-diligence we have done on the data set we have used in this paper.
Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy that we have used in this paper. Section 5 presents
the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Demonetization: Background and discussion
The objective of demonetization as was claimed initially, was to target black money and
eventually curbing corruption. One other objective that was highlighted during the initial
phases was to flush out the fake currency notes that have been a concern for both the
Government and the Reserve of India (RBI) for a long time. But the amount of fake currency
in the total system, or at least what is identified as fake currency is very low. As per RBI
Annual Report 2016-17, 0.003 % of the total notes supplied in 2016-17 were identified as
Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN). But, as of 2016-17 the 500 (old design) and 1000 rupee
notes accounted for 75 percent of the total FICN detected by the banking system. Since the
use of FICN are mainly through higher denomination notes, it was believed that the move
would discourage the use of fake currency in the system.
Whatever may be the objectives of demonetization, removing 86 per cent of the currency
in circulation in order to meet those objectives is bound to have short and medium term
implications on the economy. The immediate monetary phenomenon is well captured in
figure 1 below, where it can be seen that the currency in circulation went down drastically in
the month of November-2016 and Dec-2016. As remonetization commenced after the initial
few weeks of hardship, the currency in circulation, in the recent months has slowly reverted
back to a level comparable to the pre-demonetization level. Currency that is with the public
and is considered to be part of the money supply also seems to revert to the similar levels in
the recent months as in the pre-demonetization period, after the shock in November-2016.
The announcement was made late in the evening of November 08, 2016. The timing of the
announcement was probably deliberate in order to minimize panic among people, and gave
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time to people to absorb the information. However, needless to say, the announcement was a
pure surprise. The information was not leaked prior to the announcements from any person
in the government or the Reserve Bank of India. The fact that even internal officials did
not have an iota of such a decision, gives a sense of the kind of secrecy that was maintained
prior to the announcement.
As the announcement was made late in the evening, there was no chaos reported that
night. Reports started coming from the next morning. As was the direction, for the initial
few days, general public were allowed to exchange the old 500 and 1000 rupee notes in any
bank and branch. Specifically, a person having old notes had two avenues to dispose them
off: (1) to exchange the old notes in exchange of new notes or (2) to deposit the old notes in
to their deposit accounts. The first way of disposing away the old notes were restricted to
only Rs. 4000 per person per day. Initially, people were trying to go by the first avenue to
dispose the old notes, even though there were restrictions on the amount they could exchange.
The banks also started exchanging the old notes from the general public regardless whether
they held an account with them. But the huge volume of such transactions was hard for the
banks to handle. The smaller bank branches found it difficult to handle the volume of people
and the volume of transactions. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that new notes were
not arriving at a rate that could match the demand from people. At one point when the
banks were not able to match up the pace of exchange, they reportedly were not encouraging
exchange of old notes from non-account holders. Although there were restrictions that were
put on the amount of transactions per day per person by the RBI, there was no restriction
as such to restrict the banks to their customers. This was as an operational move and no
direction was given by the RBI in this regard. However, even after putting these restrictions,
the banks found it hard to manage with the volume of its own account holders.
The second channel of disposing off the old notes was to deposit them in to the de-
posit accounts. The effect of this direction was a spike in the cash holdings of the Banks.
In fact, the cash on hand with banks (see Figure 2) increased by 288 per cent between
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October-16 and November-16. As the process of remonetization normalized from the month
of Jan-2017, the cash holdings of the banks came down, and remained stable in the recent
months. The decrease in cash holdings in the month of Jan-17 can be attributed to the
withdrawing of equivalent amount of cash in new denomination by the public as was de-
posited during demonetization.3 Now, the financially excluded people could not exploit the
bank channel of depositing old notes as this was only restricted to the account holders. All
scheduled commercial banks and urban cooperative banks were tasked to accept deposit in
old currencies. However, the District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCB) were barred from
accepting deposits in old notes. Since DCCBs are attached to Primary Agricultural Credit
Societies, this move may have hit the farmers and people in the rural areas who dependent
on agriculture. The objective of such a ban on transactions by DCCBs was to minimize the
fraudulent transactions that were reported from some DCCBs. There were some restrictions
on deposits in to individual bank accounts as well. Since the restrictions and limits kept on
being revised during this period, the last revision of such a restriction quoted that deposits
more than 2.5 lakhs would attract some penalties. Although it is expected that people who
have bank accounts would have preferred this channel of disposing off their cash, but cash
shortage in banks was a widespread phenomenon. Thus regardless of which way people re-
sorted to dispose of the cash, people had to face the hardship of getting new notes to carry
on their transactions. The first few days’ of panic was due to the process of depositing the
old notes. The identification and checks by banks on the depositors and their accounts, and
more checks in case of non-account holders made the process cumbersome.
During the first few days, the government gave some respite to the people by allowing
them to use the old currency to pay for public utilities like paying electricity bills and highway
tolls. The Government repeatedly extended the deadline for these exemptions which ended
on December 15, 2016. In fact, highway tolls were waived off until December 02, 2016. Fuel
stations were also allowed to take accept old currencies until December 02, 2016. In the rural
3This may also be on account of the liquidity operations by the RBI as it took special measures during
demonetization to mop up the excess liquidity in the system.
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sector, farmers were given relief by allowing them to use old currency notes to buy seeds.
This scheme was announced by the government on November 21, 2016 for purchase of seeds
for central and state government outlets and Agricultural Universities. As the process of
remonetization took pace, the RBI kept relaxing the withdrawals restrictions for the banks.
3 Data
The Consumer Pyramids (CP) database is a survey based data on households. The database
covers around 160,000 households during each wave of the survey. Each household in the
database is surveyed every 4 months and a block of four months is called a wave. In each of
the months in a particular wave, one-fourth of the sample is surveyed. During the survey,
the households are asked to provide data for the preceding four months. The database
is divided in to seven modules, each of which covers a different set of survey questions.
Among these seven modules, four modules cover data on stock variables. These include
questions regarding household characteristics, assets and liabilities, consumer sentiments
and unemployment status. Data pertaining to these modules appear every four months in
the data set. The dynamic variables pertaining to income, consumption, and their sub-
components are covered in three different modules. Unlike the modules that cover static
variables, data for these modules are available for every month.
The survey is primarily done at the household level that covers individual members as
well. For example, demographic characteristics, unemployment status, and income compo-
sition are available for individual members of the households. However, expenditure details
and asset and liabilities positions are available only at the household level. Since, in this
paper, we are mainly looking at income and consumption across different asset quartiles, we
restrict the unit of observation to the household. We use the demographic characteristics
of the head of the household (HOH) whenever we need to dis-aggregate the data in those
dimensions or use them as control variables. The final data set we use comprises of approx-
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imately 100,000 households over the period January-2015 to November-2017. To maintain
consistency we have tried to work on a balanced sample. The dropping of observations while
ensuring a balanced sample is mainly due the movement of families or change of family
structure, and not due to any sample selection issues.
One important distinction of this data set when compared to other available household
level databases is the panel structure. In this data set, information on household income and
expenditure, asset holdings are available over a period of time. The panel structure of the
data is essential for our analysis because we want to capture the change in household income
and consumption pattern before and after the policy which cannot be executed using a cross
section data. There have been a couple of studies that looked at the effects of demonetization
at the dis-aggregated level. Since the policy was implemented at a particular point of time,
one needs information on both the pre and post policy periods on a homogeneous group of
individual units. In order to exploit the panel structure, most of the earlier studies have
based their analyses at the district-level/ national where it is possible to create a high-
frequency panel data covering both pre and post policy period. This paper is the first of its
kind to use a panel data set on households to answer some basic questions with respect to
demonetization.
Since the CP is a new data set, we try to do some due diligence to establish the credibility
of the data. In India, the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) conducts household surveys.
Their consumption expenditure survey is done annually where they cover around 100,000
households. The coverage of the data set is huge and they cover a lot of details on household
characteristics and consumption. NSSO does an Employment-Unemployment survey where
information related to employment characteristics, wages and benefits are recorded. This
survey is done every five years. A decadal survey on assets and liabilities is also done by NSSO
that covers details on debt and asset holdings of households. In order to check consistency
of the CP data set, we present some comparable variables from both CP and NSSO. Table
1 below presents the share of expenditure in total monthly expenditure on different heads.
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The numbers are arrived at by applying the relevant weights from both the data sets. We
see that the CP data produces reasonable estimates for the shares of food and non-food
expenditures in total expenditure when compared to the NSSO. However, if we assume that
spending pattern of households have remained unchanged between 2011-12 (NSSO data) and
2014-17 (CP data), CP seems to overestimate the share of food and underestimate the share
of non-food expenditure for both rural and urban households.
Table 2 presents some state-wise aggregates in levels of total expenditure and share of
food and cereals in total expenditure. The third column reports the difference between
monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) between NSSO and CP estimates. It turns out
that CP underestimates the MPCE across all states. However, the shares of food and cereals
in total expenditure estimated from the two data sets seem to be consistent across all states.
Figure 3 presents the correlation between District GDP obtained from Indicus and total
income estimated from CP. This cross section scatter plot reveals a positive and significant
correlation between the two data sets. In other words, districts that have higher GDP also
report higher income as estimated from CP database.
The comparisons drawn with other independent data sources give some evidence on the
credibility of the data. Although, the rural/ urban shares of expenditure from CP seem to be
off from NSSO, this could be due the fact that CP over-samples the urban households. The
difference between the levels of expenditure between NSS and CP may be attributed to the
inclusion of imputed rent in NSS data which is not included in CP data. Also, since NSS data
is collected at a certain point of time, it may include some long term expenditures incurred
during the year. The CP data, being a panel data set may smooth out such expenditures
across different months. In summary, we think that CP data covers a fairly representative
sample of households. The panel structure of households is a unique feature of the data
which is not found any similar data sets that are available. The data set also appears to be
of reasonable quality and suits the purpose of our analyses.
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The basic unit of observation in the CP data set is the household. Since we focus our analysis
on the household with and without bank accounts, we present summary results with respect
to these two categories of households. Table 3 reports the monthly income and expenditure
for the treatment and control groups.4 Of the entire sample of households, only 17 percent
of the households do not have any bank account. This number is less than the 31.2 per-
cent reported in NSSO [2013] report because our estimate includes only those households
who report no bank accounts for any member in the household. We identify households
with bank account if at least one member has one bank account including the head of the
household. We use this restrictive criterion because during demonetization, households could
channelize their cash holdings of demonetized notes through any member in the household
who have a bank account. So, we expect that the effect of demonetization would be highest
for the households who have no bank accounts including the head of the household. On
average, total income and wages are lower for households with no bank accounts while av-
erage expenditure is slightly higher for these households compared to households with bank
account. We think that households who save less choose not to open a bank account. Al-
though there was an increase in bank accounts post-demonetization, we restrict our measure
of bank accounts during the pre-demonetization period. Since demonetization was an un-
expected shock, restricting ourselves to this identification strategy allows us to separate out
any endogenous effect of demonetization emanating from households who chose to open bank
accounts post-demonetization.
3.2 Construction of asset index
The objective of this study is to tease out the heterogeneous impact of demonetization on
households. We think asset holdings is an important dimension to exploit in the the Indian
economy. Asset holdings can be of two types: physical asset holding and financial asset
4The time series trends for income and consumption are presented in the Appendix.
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holding. Physical assets would include television sets, refrigerator, washing machine, air-
conditioner, house, cattle etc. Financial assets include fixed deposits, mutual funds etc. In
India, there is predominance of physical asset holdings than financial asset holdings which
have relatively lesser penetration into Indian household finance setup. Thus, for our purpose
in this paper, we mainly focus on physical asset holdings rather than financial asset holding
to classify households into different asset quartiles. Also, data on financial assets in the CP
data set is recorded in a categorical sense i.e whether or not the household own a particular
asset or not, while on the other hand CP records the actual quantity of a physical asset by
the the households. However, at a later stage we show that there is a positive relationship
between physical assets and financial assets which warrants the use of any one of the asset
definitions in our study.
We face two challenges while using the assets and liabilities information in the CP data.
First, the data is recorded as number of units and no monetary value is attached to the assets.
So, we cannot simply add the assets to come up with an asset index for the households.
Second, the weight of each asset differs in the basket of physical assets. For example, a
house and refrigerator must have different weights in the basket. We overcome these two
problems and come up with the following methodology to arrive at an index value of physical
assets for households. Let Xi,j,t be number of units of asset j held by household i at time t.
Let 1.Xi,j,t be the indicator variable if the household owns at least one unit of asset j. We
have:

1.Xi,j,t = 1 if i owns j at t
= 0 otherwise
(1)




1.Xijt/N)] ∗ wit , ∀jε[1, J ] , ∀tε[1, T ] (2)
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where wit is the sample weight of the household which is essentially the reciprocal of
probability of sampling the household from the population. Using this relative importance
of each asset we can compute the asset index for each household, which is given by:
J∑
j=1
[Xijt] ∗Wjt , ∀iε[1, N ] ,∀tε[1, T ] (3)
For the purpose of this paper, we compute this asset index for each household for each
wave. However, since we are dividing the households in to quartiles of the asset index, we use
the asset distribution for the pre-demonetization period. Ideally, we do not want to allow for
households to switch between asset quartiles, although we do not see this happening in the
data often. In other words, if demonetization had changed the distribution of assets across
households we could not have used it to identify the households in to different asset classes.
Table 5 reports the asset index computed across waves. We see that the distribution did
not move because of demonetization. Thus, we can safely use this distribution to identify
the households into separate asset quartiles. When reporting results based on the asset
quartiles we have restricted ourselves to the asset index attached to each household at the
pre-demonetization period, even though we do not find any significant change of this asset
index across different waves. Table 4 reports this asset index for the treatment and control
groups. The asset index for households with bank accounts is systematically higher than
the households with no bank account. The distribution of this asset index for the treatment
group also lies to the left of that for the control group. So, on average the treatment group
holds less assets than the control group in the pre-demonetization period.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section we discuss the empirical strategies we use. First, we discuss our baseline
specification and two variants of the baseline specification we use to tease out the heteroge-
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neous effects of demonetization on households. Second, we discuss the specification we use
to document the the increase in household indebtedness.
4.1 Baseline Specification
One of the officially announced objective of demonetization was to curb the flow of black
money. In order to meet this objective, the directions during the early stages were in favor
of those with bank accounts. As mentioned earlier, general public were allowed to exchange
notes in any bank. However, many banks due to logistical difficulties, restricted these facili-
ties to account holders only. On the other hand, the government allowed transactions in old
notes for certain public services like tolls, gas stations, hospitals etc. So, there were mainly
three avenues to dispose of the old notes: either deposit them in the bank accounts, exchange
them with new notes or spend them on public utilities. Clearly, the policy was favorable to
individuals who had a bank account where in they had an option to deposit the old notes
in their accounts. Our unit of observation is the household. Within a household there could
be members with and without bank accounts. Since a household may dispose of the old
notes even if one member has a bank account, we would like to identify those households
in which no member holds a bank account. This is our pure treatment group. Since the
policy was implemented on November 08, 2016, we consider the month of November and
post-November as the post-policy period. Our baseline specification looks like the following:
yit = β ∗ (Post ∗ Treatment) + γt + θi + εit (4)
where yit is the dependent variable of interest in log terms. The set of dependent vari-
ables include total monthly income, total monthly expenditure and their sub-categories. The
dummy variable Post takes the value 1 for months of November-2016 to February-2016. We
restrict our baseline specification to the month of February-2016 to focus on the immediate
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effects of demonetization.5 The dummy variable Treatment takes the value 1 for households
with no bank accounts. We classify the households with at least one bank account as the
control group. In this sense, we are restrictive in identifying our control group, and want
to take into account the fact that households may use the bank account of any member
within the household to dispose the old notes. We saturate our specification with house-
hold fixed effects (θi) that control for any time invarying household characteristics, regional
characteristics and demographics. We also include month fixed effects (γt) that control for
any seasonality during the specified months. The main coefficient of interest is β that gives
us the relative effect of demonetization on households without bank accounts compared to
households with bank accounts.
We use two variants of our baseline model. First, we want to explore the heterogeneity
across households. We classify the households into four asset quartiles based on the asset
index we computed. We then estimate equation 4 for four different asset quartiles: from low
to high:
yiat = βa ∗ (Post ∗ Treatment) + γt + θia + εiat , ∃ a ε [1, 4] (5)
where a is the asset quartile of the household. We hypothesize that households with
higher value of assets would be less hurt due to demonetization than households with lower
value of assets. Since physical assets are less liquid than financial assets, one may argue that
the latter is a better way to classify households. But there is a positive correlation between
the asset indices constructed using financial assets and physical assets. We prefer to use the
physical assets because it gives us a continuous distribution while financial assets give us
information only on the extensive margin.
Second, our baseline specification, does not allow us to identify the immediate effect of
demonetization and the recovery after that. In order to tease the immediate effect, we use
5In fact, there were other confounding macroeconomic shocks during the post demonetization period like
the introduction of GST (July-2017) etc. that may conflate with the medium-term effects of demonetization.
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βat ∗ (Treatment ∗Montht) + γt + θia + εiat ,∃ a ε [1, 4] (6)
where the coefficients βat give us the month-wise effect of demonetization 2 months before
and 6 months after demonetization.
4.2 Borrowings: Logit specification
Since demonetization shock was similar to a liquidity shock to the household balance sheet,
we would like to investigate whether there has been any change in household indebtedness.
Specifically, if households smooth out consumption during the period of the liquidity shock,
we expect to see an increase in borrowings for the households. These borrowings could be
from many sources: banks, money lenders, shops etc. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
many households mitigated the shock by buying goods on credit from local shops. In the
data, we do not see the amount of credit outstanding for the households. We only observe
the categorical variable whether they hold any outstanding credit or not. To be clear, the
data does not allow us to estimate the effect of the liquidity shock on household credit at
the intensive margin. We can only estimate the effects on credit at the extensive margin.
We use a simple logit specification with household fixed effects to estimate the increase in
the likelihood of indebtedness due to the liquidity shock. We estimate:
(Pr biat = 1|X) = βa ∗ (Post ∗ Treatment) + γt + θia + εiat ,∃ a ε [1, 4] (7)
where biat takes the value 1 if the households i, in asset class a, at time period t reports
borrowing from a particular source. As with logistic regression, the error terms follow a
logistic distribution. The rest of the terms carry the same meaning as in equation 4. The
coefficient βa caries a different interpretation. In this specification, βa tells us the incremental
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increase in probability (log odds ratio) of borrowing after demonetization for households
without bank accounts with respect to households with bank accounts.
5 Results
In this section we discuss the results. First, we discuss the results based on our baseline
specification. Second, we tease out the time effects to see when the households got affected
and when the recovery started. Lastly, we discuss the implications on household balance
sheet due to the sudden liquidity shock.
5.1 Baseline Results
For Tables 6-15, we only report the coefficient of the interaction term (β) in equation 4 that
captures the true effect of demonetization on the treatment group (households with no bank
account) post demonetization relative to the control group (household with at least one bank
account).
Table 6 reports the results for the baseline specification on income and the sub-components
of income: wages, government transfers, and pensions. We see that, for the entire sample
of households, there has been a slight increase in total income by about 1.5 percent post
demonetization for the treatment group. Wages show a mild increase of 0.09 percent while
other components of income do not show any significant increase. Tables 7-10 show the re-
sults on income for each asset class. If we look at asset classes 1 to asset class 3, we see that
there is no statistically significant effect on income. However, asset class 4 shows an increase
in income by about 3.2 percent. It is clear that, the increase in income we see in the total
sample, mainly comes from the increase in income for the households in asset class 4. These
could be due to the reporting of higher income by these households (in asset class 4) under
the income declaration schemes for tax purposes announced by the government right around
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the same time as demonetization.6 Moreover, since the shock was primarily a temporary
liquidity shock, we do not expect to see a huge drop in income reported for households with
a continuous flow of income. We would however show some evidence for different professions
when we discuss the monthly effects.
Tables 11-15 report the results for expenditure and its components. Since demonetization
was a liquidity shock, one would think the natural outcome to be a drop in expenditure.
Table 11 reports the results for all households across all asset classes. As with income, we
see that there has been an increase in expenditure by about 1.8 percent for the treatment
group post demonetization. The increase has mainly come from an increase in spending on
food and apparels. In fact the increase in spending on apparels increased by 3.3 percent
which is more than the average increase in total spending. Breaking up in to asset classes
(see Tables 12-15), we see that the increase in total spending was highest for the lower asset
classes with total spending increasing by 2.1 percent. This increase is contributed by food
and apparel with 2.6 and 13.2 percent increase respectively for the treatment group post
demonetization. The increase in spending for the higher asset classes has been close to the
average increase in spending for all asset class. It is counter-intuitive to see an increase
in spending after a sudden liquidity shock. This could simply mean that households with
no bank accounts wanted to get rid of the old notes by spending, as the bank channel to
exchange and deposit old notes did not work for them. Moreover, it is important to note that
the recovery phase post-demonetization has been quite rapid as the process of remonetization
gathered pace. The months of Jan-16 and Feb-16 saw sharp recovery post demonetization
which is essentially captured in these specification. A close look at the monthly effects would
help us tease out, if any, an expected negative shock on income and expenditure.
6The Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMGKY) was a voluntary income declaration scheme that
came into effect on December 17, 2016 and continued until March 31, 2017. Under this scheme, people could
declare undisclosed income only in the form of cash and bank deposits in Indian banks. The declaration
attracted roughly 50 percent of the total amount in taxes and surcharges, and a mandatory deposit of 25
percent in the zero-interest Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Deposit Scheme (PMGKDS) for four years. The
proceeds from this scheme were intended to be spent toward poverty alleviation programs.
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5.2 Monthly trends
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the baseline specification cannot identify the im-
mediate effect of demonetization, as it covers the recovery phase post demonetization. In
other words, it gives us a macro overview of the impact of the shock which seems quite
innocuous at this point. However, a deeper analysis is required to understand the phases of
the shock transmission, which is what we do next. In order, to tease out this effect, we run
the specification 6 with interaction terms for each month. We plot the monthly coefficients
for each of the asset classes for the months September-2016 to April-2017.
Figure 4 reports the results for household income for each asset class. There is roughly a
uniform pattern across households for the months preceding demonetization. All asset classes
show an increase in income in September-2016, a decrease in October-2016. Households ex-
perienced a slight improvement in November-2016 compared to the previous month although
they are statistically insignificant for most of the asset classes. The magnitudes of these ef-
fects differ across asset classes. The effects of demonetization can be seen in December-2016,
when income decreased by more than 2 percent and 5 percent for households in the lowest
and the highest classes respectively. We do see a decrease in income for the second and third
asset quartiles, however, the coefficients are statistically insignificant. These effects slowly
die down in the post-demonetization months, the sharpest recovery being seen for the 4th
asset quartile.
Figure 5 reports the results for household expenditure for each asset class. For all as-
set classes, there were signs of increase in expenditure in the pre-demonetization period.
Specifically, for the month of November-2016, when we see an increase in income, we see an
increase in the expenditure as well. Before that, October-2016 was bad as all asset classes
saw a decrease in expenditure. Post-demonetization, December-2016 saw a large drop in
expenditure and this drop is significant for all asset classes. Expenditure for the treatment
group decreased by about 7 percent for the highest asset quartile, while it decreased by
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around 3 percent for the 1st asset quartile. Post December-2016, all the asset classes saw a
recovery in expenditure starting from January-2017.
The recovery phase post December-2016 is what is captured in the baseline specification
which on average shows an increase in total spending post demonetization. However, when
we break up the effect in to monthly effects, we see that the largest effect has been in the
month of December-2016 and this is consistent across all asset classes. In terms of income,
the largest negative impact is seen for the 4th asset quartile followed by the 1st asset quartile.
We see the same pattern for expenditure well. The larger decrease in income and expenditure
for the higher asset quartile could be because of the fact that these households are relatively
more reliant on cash transactions. It would be interesting to see the effects of demonetization
by profession and tease out the effects, if any, across the nature of the jobs.
5.3 Effects by profession
Figure 6 reports the coefficients for December-2016 for different professions. Panel A reports
the coefficients for total income and Panel B reports the coefficients for total expenditure.
We see that for income, the largest negative effect is seen for businessmen. While for ex-
penditure, the coefficients are negative for almost all professions, and is seen in income,
businessmen took the largest hit. Surprisingly, both for income and expenditure, white col-
lar clerical employees and professionals report large negative effects. While we don’t have
a good explanation why this could be case, we can definitely say that the highest quartile
mainly comprise of businessmen, and white collar employees which may be driving the large
negative effect in that quartile compared to the lower quartiles.
5.4 Borrowings
We have shown that households across all asset classes experienced a drop in income and
expenditure in the month of December-2016. However, there is significant heterogeneity in
the magnitude of these effects. We also see a significant difference in the recovery phase
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for each of the 4 asset classes. In this section, we try to explain the mechanism that may
have contributed to the recovery of the household finances after the sudden liquidity shock
due to demonetization. Specifically, we focus on the borrowing channels that are available
to the households with and without bank accounts how they have used these channels to
smooth out their consumption levels post demonetization. It may be important to reiterate
the nature of data on borrowings here. In the CP data, we only see the categorical variable
on whether the households have borrowed from any source for any purpose. So, we are not
able to quantify the amount of borrowings. We can only infer on the probability of borrowing
for the households by using the binary responses of households on borrowings.
Figure 7 reports the fraction of households borrowing from any source for different pur-
poses. The horizontal axis denotes the survey rounds for the treatment and control groups.
Round 8 is the pre-demonetization period, while wave 9 includes the demonetization period.
The post demonetization period starts from wave 10.7 We see that on average, borrowings
increased for households post-demonetization, and the increase has been primarily on ac-
count of consumption (maroon bars). Households without bank accounts appears to have
borrowed more for consumption than households with bank accounts. This insinuates to the
fact that households with no bank accounts are relatively more liquidity constrained than
households with bank accounts, and they are likely to resort to borrowings to smooth out
their consumption.
The source of borrowings however may be quite different from for the treatment and the
control group. This distribution may also vary across the asset classes. Figure 8, reports
the source of borrowings across the survey rounds for both the treatment and the control
groups. As there has been an overall increase in borrowings, we see a secular increase in
borrowings from banks, moneylenders and shops. The increase in borrowings from banks
have increased significantly for the treatment group mainly because of the fact that many
households may have opened bank account post-demonetization. Interestingly, the treatment
7Wave 8 covers the months of June-2016 to August-2016. Wave 9 covers the months September-2016 to
December-2016. Wave 10 covers the months January-2017 to April-2017.
21
group in the fourth asset quartile has been proactive in approaching banks for borrowings
than the lower asset quartile. The lower asset quartile on the other hand appears to be
more comfortable with borrowings from money lenders as the fraction of households in that
category (treatment and asset class1) increased significantly post demonetization. There
is some similarity between the treatment group in asset class 1 and asset class 4 as far as
borrowings from shops are concerned. Anecdotal evidence during demonetization suggests
that households coped with the liquidity shock by buying goods and services on credit from
shops. This seems to holds true for all the asset classes but the evidence is prominent for
the households in the first and fourth asset quartiles.
Next, we present results from the logistic regressions as in equation 7. The coefficient
tells us the relative increase in the probability (log odds ratio) of borrowing for the treat-
ment group post demonetization. Figures 9 to 12 report the coefficient beta from equation
7 for each source of borrowing and for each asset class. It turns out that the probability
of borrowing from any source increased more for the treatment group post-demonetization
for asset class 3 compared to other asset classes. We now break these up in to different
sources of borrowing. Figure 10 reports the coefficients for borrowing from banks. The
treatment group in asset class 3 shows the highest increase in the probability of borrow-
ing post demonetization. For borrowings from money-lenders (Figure 11), the treatment
group in asset class 1 shows a significant increase in the probability of borrowing, while the
treatment group is asset class 4 shows the least increase. This result is consistent with the
observation that households in the lower asset quartile find it easier to approach a money
lender. Borrowings from shops, as reported in Figure 12, increased for the treatment group
in the 4th asset quartile. We see a negative coefficient for the 1st asset quartile which only
means that relative to the control group, the probability of borrowings from shops for the
treatment group decreased post-demonetization. This is mainly because of the fact, that
within both the treatment and control groups, the fraction of households borrowing from
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shops increased post-demonetization (see Figure 8). But the increase has been more among
households in the control group within the asset class.
Tying these results up with the baseline results we presented for income and consumption,
it appears that the sudden liquidity shock had a temporary effect on the household finance.
Households appear to smooth out their consumption and also recover from the temporary
fall in consumption by resorting to borrowings. This mechanism seem to have increased
the overall borrowings for households. Our logistic regressions show that the probability of
borrowing from different sources, especially informal sources like money-lenders and shops
increased post demonetization. The magnitude of such increases in the probability of bor-
rowing however differs for different asset classes. Overall, our results show that households
were able to tackle the sudden liquidity shock. However, there has been a structural shift of
household indebtedness in the post demonetization period which may increase the stress on
household finances in the medium term.
6 Conclusion
The recent demonetization exercise in India is a unique monetary experiment that made
86 percent of the total currency in circulation invalid. Using household level micro data,
we document the heterogeneous effects of this monetary shock among the households that
had access to bank accounts and those that did not (i.e. financially included vs. excluded
households). We also, quantitatively evaluate the impact at various quartiles of the asset
distribution.
We find that households with no bank accounts experienced a significant decrease in both
income and expenditure in December-2016. The recovery in the post-demonetization period
appears to be quick although, as we show in the paper, households managed to smooth
consumption mainly by borrowing from informal sources such as money lenders and shops.
This points to an important structural change that the Indian economy has undergone. The
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macro picture of the shock may look transient but it has contributed to increasing household
indebtedness which in turn has made them more vulnerable than before.
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Tables
Table 1: Expenditure Shares: Consumer Pyramids and NSSO (All-India Averages)
Rural Urban
Share in Total. Expen (%) CP NSSO CP NSSO
Cereals and Pulses 14.0 10.7 17.3 6.6
Milk and Milk products 10.1 8.0 9.4 7.0
Sugar 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.0
Edible Oil 5.0 3.7 4.0 2.7
Protein 6.8 4.8 6.4 3.7
Vegetables 7.3 6.6 6.1 4.6
Fruits 1.4 2.2 1.7 2.6
Total Food 56.7 52.9 50.4 42.6
Tobacco, Pan, Gutkha 2.7 3.2 1.9 1.6
Power and Fuel 15.4 8.0 18.6 6.7
Apparel 3.5 6.0 3.7 5.4
Footwear 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0
Education 3.0 3.5 3.3 6.9
Health 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.0
Recreation 0.2 1.0 0.4 1.6
Toiletries 7.7 2.1 7.6 2.1
Transport 2.7 4.2 2.7 6.5
Total Non-Food 43.3 47.1 49.6 57.4
Notes: ’CP’ is Consumer Pyramids. ’NSSO’ stands for National Sample Survey Office.
Share of item ’x’=Monthly per capita Expenditure on ’x’/ Monthly per capita Total Expen-
diture .
Estimates from CP are based on monthly averages across states between the period Jan-2014
and July-2017.
The food and non-food sub categories may not add up. Comparisons are based on consistent
sub-categories across the two data sets.
Estimates for NSSO are taken from ”Key Indicators of Household Consumer Expenditure in
India”, NSS 68th round. Period: July-2011 and June-2012.
All estimates are in 2011-12 Rupees.
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Table 2: Comparison between Consumer Pyramids and NSSO
MPCE Share of Food Share of Cereals
in Rs Deviation (%) in Total Expen. (%) in Total Expen. (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
States CP NSSO (2)-(1)/(2) CP NSSO CP NSSO
Jammu & Kashmir 1708.5 2132.5 19.9 48.5 54.4 9.8 10.1
Himachal Pradesh 2042.5 2641.9 22.7 46.0 47.2 12.5 7.1
Punjab 2390.2 2634.5 9.3 50.3 44.6 9.7 5.3
Chandigarh 3120.8 3051.9 -2.3 42.8 43.3 7.2 5.9
Uttarakhand 2151.0 2059.7 -4.4 49.9 50.3 11.8 8.9
Haryana 2255.5 2967.5 24.0 48.0 48.8 9.6 5.0
Delhi 1617.5 3106.0 47.9 49.1 43.1 11.6 5.4
Rajasthan 1529.5 2025.0 24.5 48.9 50.2 11.9 7.5
Uttar Pradesh 1442.3 1586.4 9.1 56.0 51.4 15.6 10.0
Bihar 1196.1 1336.3 10.5 61.7 58.0 22.0 14.5
Assam 1534.6 1684.1 8.9 52.0 58.0 16.0 14.1
West Bengal 1374.0 1900.0 27.7 57.9 54.6 17.2 13.4
Jharkhand 1230.0 1480.1 16.9 53.7 55.8 17.5 15.1
Odisha 1079.5 1445.4 25.3 53.4 54.5 17.5 14.7
Chhattisgarh 1129.3 1429.0 21.0 49.0 50.4 14.6 11.7
Madhya Pradesh 1231.5 1586.9 22.4 49.4 50.5 12.0 9.9
Gujarat 1471.2 2046.3 28.1 53.1 53.0 11.7 7.6
Maharashtra 1984.9 2357.0 15.8 49.4 50.0 13.2 8.1
Andhra Pradesh 1743.8 2224.7 21.6 51.1 49.7 18.3 9.3
Karnataka 1563.6 2251.7 30.6 47.5 48.7 13.9 8.5
Goa 2969.2 2782.9 -6.7 41.0 50.2 8.0 7.1
Kerala 2292.8 3095.8 25.9 44.8 42.2 11.4 5.3
Tamil Nadu 1708.5 2160.3 20.9 49.5 49.9 14.2 8.2
Puducherry 2055.9 2709.0 24.1 42.9 49.2 10.8 7.0
Total 1784.3 2195.6 18.5 49.8 53.6 15.6 9.2
Observations 24
Notes: ’MPCE’ is Monthly Per Capita Expenditure. ’CP’ is Consumer Pyramids. ’NSSO’
stands for National Sample Survey Office.
MPCE=Total Monthly Hhd. Expenditure/ Total Members in the Household.
Estimates from CP are based on monthly averages across states between the period Jan-2014
and Dec-2016.
Estimates for NSSO are taken from ”Key Indicators of Household Consumer Expenditure in
India”, NSS 68th round. Period: July-2011 and June-2012.
All estimates are in 2011-12 Rupees.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics -Treatment and Control
No Bank Ac With Bank Ac
mean sd mean sd
TOTAL INCOME 11173.8 8162.9 12696.6 9054.9
WAGES 10128.3 7687.5 11223.6 8777.2
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 7849.2 3764.8 7486.7 3218.6
EXPENSE ON FOOD 3597.4 1252.8 3791.2 1248.1
Observations 722,353 3,343,976
Table 4: Asset Index, By Bank Account
Bank Account mean sd p25 p50 p75 p90
No 16.2 20.6 4.3 7.5 18.0 46.1
Yes 18.2 21.3 4.9 10.4 22.0 49.0
Total 17.9 21.2 4.7 9.8 21.5 49.0
Table 5: Distribution of Asset Index
Statistic Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9
Mean 17.67 17.44 17.06
Min 0 0 0
Max. 313.77 243.14 398.64
p10 2.18 2.22 2.20
p25 4.73 4.80 4.32
p50 9.24 8.59 8.33
p75 21.50 20.78 18.82
p90 48.0 48.94 48.16
Obs 132908 132399 132777
Table 6: Difference in Difference Estimation (Income: Over all asset classes)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Wages Govt Tranf Pension
Post*Treatment 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.005 0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 689985 616719 90347 84752
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Difference in Difference Estimation (Income: Asset Class 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Wages Govt Tranf Pension
Post*Treatment 0.010 0.008 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.022)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 144804 135713 17667 13973
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 8: Difference in Difference Estimation (Income:Asset Class 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Wages Govt Tranf Pension
Post*Treatment 0.008 0.004 -0.026∗ 0.020
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.023)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 158768 147158 22439 16583
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 9: Difference in Difference Estimation (Income:Asset Class 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Wages Govt Tranf Pension
Post*Treatment 0.007 0.009 0.039∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.022)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 147123 133574 20496 15950
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Difference in Difference Estimation (Income:Asset Class 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Wages Govt Tranf Pension
Post*Treatment 0.032∗∗∗ 0.012 0.013 0.013
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.016)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 155078 125833 18060 27835
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 11: Difference in Difference Estimation (Expenditure: Over all asset classes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expenditure Food Apparel Appliances Restaurants Transport Health
Post*Treatment 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.006 0.011∗ 0.004 0.013∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 689985 689985 510305 121677 411222 620468 628984
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 12: Difference in Difference Estimation (Expenditure: Asset Class 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expenditure Food Apparel Appliances Restaurants Transport Health
Post*Treatment 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.007 0.010 0.020
(0.005) (0.004) (0.025) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 144804 144804 96327 18977 72998 132817 129632
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: Difference in Difference Estimation (Expenditure::Asset Class 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expenditure Food Apparel Appliances Restaurants Transport Health
Post*Treatment 0.014∗∗ 0.005 0.089∗∗∗ 0.037 0.025∗ 0.016 0.027∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.025) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 158768 158768 112783 25247 89999 141829 142698
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14: Difference in Difference Estimation (Expenditure::Asset Class 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expenditure Food Apparel Appliances Restaurants Transport Health
Post*Treatment 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.022 -0.030 0.011 0.017 0.029∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 147123 147123 115084 27623 89287 130785 133830
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 15: Difference in Difference Estimation (Expenditure:Asset Class 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expenditure Food Apparel Appliances Restaurants Transport Health
Post*Treatment 0.014∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.000 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 155078 155078 122248 33008 109393 139321 145557
All specifications include Hhd FE. Standard errors are clustered at the Hhd level.
Post*Treatment denotes the interaction dummy for Hhds with no bank Acs
and the post-demonetization months.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figures
Figure 1: Currency in Circulation
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Figure 2: Cash on Hand with Banks
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Figure 3: Comparing District GDP (Indicus) vs Total Income (Consumer Pyramids)
(a) 2015
(b) 2014
Notes: These two figures plot the log of Total Income (computed from Consumer Pyramids)
and District GDP (from Indicus Analytics) for the years 2014 and 2015. The positive correlation
between the two signifies that the two data sets are broadly consistent. In other words, districts
with higher (lower) GDP are also the districts with higher (lower) total income. Plots are based
on common 402 districts (roughly 413 districts are covered in CP excl. Delhi).
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Figure 4: DiD, Monthly Trends: Total Income
(a) Asset Class 1 (b) Asset Class 2
(c) Asset Class 3 (d) Asset Class 4
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Figure 5: DiD, Monthly Trends: Total Expenditure
(a) Asset Class 1 (b) Asset Class 2
(c) Asset Class 3 (d) Asset Class 4
Figure 6: DiD: By Profession (December-2016)
(a) Income (b) Expenditure
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Figure 7: Borrowings (by purpose), by Asset Classes (Across Waves)
(a) Asset Class 1 (b) Asset Class 2
(c) Asset Class 3 (d) Asset Class 4
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Figure 8: Borrowings (by source, any purpose), by Asset Classes (Across Waves)
(a) Asset Class 1 (b) Asset Class 2
(c) Asset Class 3 (d) Asset Class 4
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Figure 9: Logit Coefficients: Borrowings, Any source
This figure plots the coefficient of the (treatment*post) in a logit regression. The coefficients
tell us the relative probability of borrowing of households without bank accounts compared
to households with bank accounts before and after demonetization.
Figure 10: Logit Coefficients: Borrowings, Banks
This figure plots the coefficient of the (treatment*post) in a logit regression. The coefficients
tell us the relative probability of borrowing of households without bank accounts compared
to households with bank accounts before and after demonetization.
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Figure 11: Logit Coefficients: Borrowings, Moneylenders
This figure plots the coefficient of the (treatment*post) in a logit regression. The coefficients
tell us the relative probability of borrowing of households without bank accounts compared
to households with bank accounts before and after demonetization.
Figure 12: Logit Coefficients: Borrowings, Shops
This figure plots the coefficient of the (treatment*post) in a logit regression. The coefficients
tell us the relative probability of borrowing of households without bank accounts compared
to households with bank accounts before and after demonetization.
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Figure 13: Logit Coefficients: Borrowings, Any source (Wave-wise)
This figure plots the coefficient of the (treatment*post) in a logit regression. The coefficients
tell us the relative probability of borrowing of households without bank accounts compared







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2: HH Expenditure
(a) Levels (Rs.)
(b) YoY Growth (Percent)
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Figure A.3: HH Expenditure on Food
(a) Levels (Rs.)
(b) YoY Growth (Percent)
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Figure A.4: Total HH Savings, by No. of Bank Acs
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